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What	is	wrong	with	the	Nordic	model?
The	economic	and	social	policies	pursued	in	the	Nordic	countries	are	often	cited	as	examples	of	good
governance	for	other	states	to	follow.	But	should	the	rise	of	right-wing	populist	parties	in	Denmark,
Finland,	Norway	and	Sweden	prompt	a	reassessment	of	this	Nordic	approach?	Michael	Cottakis
argues	that	the	Sweden	Democrats’	result	in	the	2018	Swedish	election	highlighted	the	country’s	failure
to	manage	immigration	effectively.	Unless	the	Swedish	government	can	facilitate	better	education	of
foreigners	and	promote	more	flexible	recruitment	policies,	the	country	could	soon	become	an
archetypal	example	of	the	hollowing	out	of	the	much-vaunted	Nordic	model.
Political	scientists	love	the	Nordics.	They	seem	to	have	everything	right.	Their	model	is	often	held	up	as	the	pinnacle
of	good	governance,	economics,	and	social	policy.	Adoption	of	Scandinavian	institutions	and	ways	of	doing	things	by
other	countries	is	wistfully	advocated	by	disaffected	citizens	in	other	parts	of	Europe.	But	is	the	Nordic	model	losing
some	of	its	traditional	lustre?	With	the	Sweden	Democrats	scoring	over	17%	at	the	recent	Swedish	elections,	and
with	far-right	movements	gaining	ground	in	Denmark,	it	seems	the	Nordics	are	more	like	the	rest	of	us	than	perhaps
first	thought.
The	strong	performance	of	far-right	parties	in	Sweden,	Denmark,	and	Finland	is	regularly	traced	to	dissatisfaction
with	the	EU.	Many	conservative	commentators	will	suggest	that	membership	of	the	single	market	forces	traditionally
liberal	and	free-trade	oriented	Nordic	states	to	work	within	an	economic	straitjacket,	compromising	growth,	and	the
quality	of	economic	institutions.	It	is	an	argument	taken	further	by	the	populists:	free	movement	of	persons	within	the
EU	leads	to	the	admission	of	large	numbers	of	‘undesirables’,	poisoning	traditional	Nordic	societies.	This	is	rhetoric
UK	readers	might	recognise.
But	is	the	EU	the	root	cause?	My	suggestion	is	no.	Indeed,	the	most	successful	right-wing	populist	party	in
Scandinavia	is	the	Norwegian	Progress	Party,	which	unlike	the	Sweden	Democrats	or	the	Danish	People’s	Party,	is
in	government.	Norway,	of	course,	is	not	a	member	of	the	EU.	Moreover,	little	evidence	exists	that	EU	regulation	has
curtailed	Nordic	competitiveness	–	quite	the	opposite.	Major	Scandinavian	multinationals,	such	as	IKEA,	H&M,	and
Maersk,	have	rode	on	the	openness	afforded	them	by	the	single	market	to	achieve	considerable	growth	in	the	last
twenty	years.
Malmö,	Sweden,	Credit:	Maria	Eklind	(CC	BY-SA	2.0)
So,	if	not	the	EU,	what	is	happening	to	the	Nordics?	Clearly,	high	quality	institutions,	well-functioning	economies,	and
strong	social	security	systems	have	not	saved	the	countries	from	the	wrath	of	the	global	populist	backlash,	with	all	its
anti-immigrant	and	nativist	venom.
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That	immigration	is	the	most	contentious	issue	in	Scandinavian	politics	would	seem	somewhat	surprising.	The
tolerance,	openness,	and	charity	of	Nordic	societies	towards	immigrants	is	noteworthy.	Swedish	colleagues	of	mine
have	often	used	the	term	‘humanitarian	superpower’	to	describe	their	country’s	friendliness	towards	immigrants	and
people	in	need.
Humanitarian	superpower	or	not,	the	record	of	integrating	immigrants	into	Swedish	society	is	at	best	patchy.
According	to	estimates	from	the	Swedish	Migration	Agency,	a	foreigner,	or	non-native,	is	three	times	less	likely	to	get
a	job.	The	segregation	of	foreigners	from	Swedes	is	another	significant	concern.	In	the	predominantly	immigrant
district	of	Rosengard	in	Malmo,	employment	figures	stand	at	only	27%	–	compared	with	78%	nationally.
Much	of	this	stems	from	the	structural	needs	of	the	Swedish	economy.	Formally	an	industrial	hub,	Sweden’s	is	today
more	service	or	technology-oriented	than	any	economy	in	northern	Europe.	To	compound	this,	company	hiring
policies	are	strict	and	require	even	entry-level	recruits	to	be	highly	educated	–	in	some	cases	only	a	Master’s	degree
is	enough	to	guarantee	an	interview.	For	immigrant	families,	postgraduate	education	involves	problems,	not	only
because	of	the	financial	cost	(many	Master’s	courses	are	free),	but	mainly	due	to	the	cost	in	time.	Many	will	end	up
working	low-paid	jobs,	assisting	in	small	family	enterprises,	independent	shops,	or	pharmacies.	Many	more	will	be
unemployed.	In	small	isolated	cases,	the	resentment	might	lead	to	criminal	activity.	This	in	turn	mobilises
conservative	groups	in	opposition	to	foreigners.	It	is	a	cycle	well-known	in	other	parts	of	western	Europe.
The	populist	surge	of	the	last	few	years	has	much	to	do	with	the	sheer	numbers	of	immigrants	coming	in.	In	2015
alone,	over	160,000	refugees	were	welcomed	into	Sweden	at	huge	political	cost	for	the	Social	Democrat-led	coalition
government.	Even	prior	to	this,	the	country’s	public	services	were	creaking:	schools,	hospitals,	and	housing	struggle
to	soak	up	the	volume.	The	Sweden	Democrats	surged	in	the	polls,	forcing	the	government	to	impose	a	30,000	limit
on	net	immigration.
Paradoxically,	Sweden	has	significant	demand	for	high	skilled	labour.	With	start-ups	and	high	growth	enterprises
emerging	at	a	fast	pace,	the	existing	labour	force	struggles	to	provide	the	resources	needed.	The	temptation	for
many	firms	is	to	consider	pastures	new,	with	London	and	Berlin	well-known	destinations.	The	labour	shortfall	thus
poses	an	existential	risk	to	the	Swedish	economy,	one	which	politicians	on	both	sides	of	the	political	centre	are
struggling	to	get	to	grips	with.
Against	such	a	backdrop,	immigrants	may	yet	prove	to	be	Sweden’s	salvation.	For	this,	significant	investment	must
be	made,	ensuring	that	more	immigrants	receive	a	university	education	or	technical	training.	This	would	require	an
effort	to	grow	the	university	sector,	increasing	the	number	of	taught	places	available.	More	online	Master’s	courses
would	allow	aspirational	young	immigrants	to	complete	postgraduate	education	while	working	to	bring	in	much
needed	cash.	Public	schools	might	concentrate	on	teaching	basic	IT	and	programming,	meaning	such	skills	are
learnt	by	all	at	an	early	age,	before	university.	Companies	too	could	show	more	flexibility	in	who	they	hire.	A	Master’s
degree	is	not	always	better	than	a	Bachelor’s.
Better	education	of	foreigners	and	more	flexible	recruitment	policies	can	help	solve	Sweden’s	immigration	crisis.
Furthermore,	immigrants	can	provide	a	new	impetus	for	the	Swedish	economy.	Future	Swedish	governments	must
communicate	these	facts	to	their	citizens,	or	face	the	slow	hollowing	out	of	the	much-vaunted	Nordic	model.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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